Influences
Introduction
The theory and practice of monitoring and evaluation is cluttered with new ideas, novel approaches, and the latest toolkits. Few of these innovations endure and even fewer come to represent a shift away from the established paradigm. While the emergence of feedback systems is beginning to take root in development practice, it is timely to consider how they compare to two established approaches and whether feedback really does signify something new. In this article, the authors compare the origins and key attributes of feedback systems, participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) and logical framework approaches. The major strengths and weaknesses of each approach are discussed, based on a review of leading academic and practitioner literature. Logframes and participatory monitoring and evaluation were selected as two dominant and established approaches to monitoring in the international development sector. Feedback was selected as an innovative and encouraging emerging approach.
This article focuses on monitoring rather than evaluation. Monitoring is the measurement activity between design, at the beginning, and evaluation, at the end of a development intervention. Monitoring is generally seen as, 'a continuing function that uses systematic collection of data … to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indicators of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives…' (OECD 2010) . The aim of monitoring is to report progress, identify lessons and make improvements during the lifetime of an intervention.
Monitoring is closely related to the process of planning. Similar tools may be used for both processes, such as logframes and participatory techniques. The tools are often expected to meet many different stakeholders' requirements. The range of stakeholders involved may include: different groups of intended beneficiaries, implementing staff, operating partners, implementing managers, senior managers and Abstract This article compares key attributes, strengths and weaknesses of three different approaches to monitoring development interventions: the logical framework approach, participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) and feedback systems. Academic and practitioner literature describes how logframes meet the needs of senior decision-makers to summarise, organise and compare projects. PM&E meets the needs of field staff to work sensitively with intended beneficiaries and support their learning and empowerment. Feedback systems appear to link the two, providing performance data for managers and creating incentives for implementing staff to focus on their intended beneficiaries. Feedback systems build on the rich heritage of PM&E and are compatible with logframes. They may help provide a manageable and effective approach to accountability that links the means and the ends of development interventions. Feedback systems are at an early stage of development. There is a lot to learn about how and where they work best.
donors. Their requirements may include: building their skills and confidence to take action, learning about the efficacy of different interventions, improving project activities, designing effective projects, communicating project activities and goals, approving project funding, winning funding and building a positive public profile. The different approaches discussed in this article respond to different priorities from this list.
Logical Framework Approach
The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) is widely used by many major development organisations to plan, manage and monitor interventions. The approach was originally developed for military planning in the USA. It was adopted by USAID for development projects in the late 1960s. In the 1980s it was adopted by many international and official development organisations. By the 1990s it had become standard in many major bilateral donors, much of the European Commission and many large international NGOs (Hummelbrunner 2010; Bakewell and Garbutt 2005; Nakabayashi 2000) . In effect, it has become the leading industrystandard approach to planning, approving, managing and monitoring development interventions (see Boxes 1 and 2).
At the heart of LFA is the 'logical framework' matrix. Vertically, a 'results-chain' describes an intervention's activities and the outputs, outcomes and impacts which are expected to result from them. Variations of the approach substitute different terms such as 'goals', 'aims' or 'purpose' for different levels and use different definitions of 'outcomes'. The underlying logic is essentially the same. Horizontally, columns describe 'objectively verifiable indicators', 'means of verification' and 'assumptions', for each level of activities and results. The overall matrix sets out how a set of activities are expected to contribute to wider changes and how activities and changes will be monitored.
LFA has been the subject of long-running controversy in development assistance. The literature sets out strongly held views of its strengths and weaknesses. A body of evidence is emerging about the impact of logframes on different stakeholders' abilities to plan, manage and monitor development programmes.
Logframes bring significant benefits for a range of stakeholders. Their longevity suggests that, to a great extent, they meet the needs of powerful decision-makers in development organisations. Logframes provide a short and convenient summary of a project, useful for internal and external communications. They simplify complex social situations and make them relatively easy to understand, linking budgets to actions and expected results. This can be
Box 1 DFID's experience with logframes
Since the mid-1980s, the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID) has adopted the LFA as part of its Project Memorandum. While the LFA has remained a key instrument, its application over the past few decades has been more variable in terms of the monitoring and management of interventions. Internal reviews have shown significant quality issues around objective and target setting, as well as with indicators and the robustness of evidence used to justify scores.
1 In 2009, DFID issued guidance for a revised and expanded version of the logframe, mandatory for all of their projects of £1 million or more. The revisions were designed to address weaknesses reported internally, by 'encouraging the identification of objectives at the right level; more robust specification of indicators; increased coverage of baseline and target information; and better quantification of results' (DFID 2009: 24) . After many years' experience, apparently not all of the expected benefits of logframes were being realised.
The guidance states that the logframe 'will help you and your team to: achieve stakeholder consensus; organise your thinking; summarise and link the key aspects and anticipated impact of your project; communicate information concisely and unambiguously; and identify measurable performance indicators and the means of verifying progress' (DFID 2009: 5) . Further benefits are listed, such as 'well defined outputs tell us exactly what we expect to see as a result of our project' (DFID 2009: 32) .
particularly useful for the key management tasks of approving projects and allocating resources. They also provide a tool for setting measurable goals and the basis for assessing performance towards them: they provide a basis for holding implementing organisations or staff to account.
The literature describes how logframes can encourage project staff to think through the logic of an intervention and identify how a specific set of actions are expected to contribute to longer term impact and tackling root causes as well as symptoms of social issues. Proponents note that the wider Logical Framework Approach includes using participatory processes to develop logframes, such as working with partners and intended beneficiaries to identify objectives and indicators. They also describe how logframes can be revised during implementation, in the light of unfolding events. The logframe itself is described as a 'neutral' tool which when properly applied provides a framework for managing many different types of social actions. (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005; DFID 2009; Hummelbrunner 2010) The literature also describes significant difficulties associated with the use of logframes (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005; Hummelbrunner 2010; Wallace 2006) . Logframes assume that complex social issues can be reduced to one key goal shared by all interest groups, yet in general, this is inadequate for tackling political issues where interests diverge or conflict. Logframes assume a linear logic, that if 'a' happens, then 'b' will follow, and then 'c'. This is not an adequate model for describing social processes which are uncertain, involving complex and often unpredictable interactions between different people and events.
2 Logframes tend to exaggerate the influence of external actors and do not tackle the problem of attribution: a development intervention is likely to be one factor among many related to longer term social change and seldom the most important one (for instance, compared to government, cultural norms or economic pressure). Logframes present a summary of actual events and analysis, which is open to a wide range of interpretations by different stakeholders.
There are also numerous cases where logframes do not work well for implementing staff. They often do not provide a useful guide for staff to tackle the daily issues they face in engaging with partners and local communities. Wallace (2006) found that field staff do not use them once implementation starts: there is a split between the documented plans and the work that is actually undertaken. Among the political realities of negotiating and agreeing project proposals, logframes tend to become inflexible. The more participatory the process in developing them, the harder it is to change them. Indicators can easily become targets, as Hummelbrunner (2010) describes in the EU PHARE project. Logframes have been described as 'lock-frames', inducing a project specific 'tunnel vision' which focuses on completing pre-planned activities, rather than engaging with changing realities on the ground.
The effect is exacerbated when logframes are used as the basis of accountability to donors, as future funding depends on completing the
Box 2 GTZ's experience with logframes
The German government-owned Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) was one of the first major European agencies to adopt the LFA, through a variant called ZOPP (Ziel Orientierte Projekt Planung, or objectives-oriented project planning). GTZ made ZOPP mandatory in 1983. Criticisms led to ZOPP being downgraded to just one tool among many others by the mid-1990s. By 2002, a new framework was instituted for GTZ contracts which focused on development objectives and results, rather than operational details. This is reported as leading to shorter documents, less prescriptive designs and more flexibility in implementation (Hummelbrunner 2010: 27) .
The framework is supported by a management model called 'Capacity WORKS'. The model is structured around five 'success factors': strategy, cooperation, steering structure, processes, learning and innovation. Key questions guide staff through each success factor, with additional practical support from a management toolbox. LFA is included as one of 40 management tools. Capacity WORKS was piloted in 2007-08 and since 2009 has been introduced in all GTZ projects and programmes worldwide.
activities and meeting the targets set out in the logframe. This accountability can only be effective based on the assumptions that: (a) logframes are developed with perfect foresight; and (b) unverified reports by implementing organisations are complete and accurate, despite their incentives to report success. This reduces the opportunity to consider unanticipated and negative consequences and so to learn and improve implementation (Ebrahim 2003; Bakewell and Garbutt 2005; Hummelbrunner 2010 ). Wallace (2006) describes for instance how these technical tools further increase the power and authority of external organisations, at the expense of supporting bottom-up action. They undermine the ability of staff to build strong relationships and partnerships and create incentives for a 'supplyled' approach to interventions.
The literature describes significant and consistent discomfort with the LFA. But the LFA continues to be used by most major organisations. It appears to have stood the test of time because it provides a straightforward summary that sets out the core logic and assumptions of an intervention alongside an approach to defining and monitoring 'success'. It appears to meet the needs of the more powerful decision-makers better than the alternatives currently available (Box 3). PM&E recognises that development results are subjective and vary between different interest groups (such as women and men). Its proponents see learning as a driver of development, and monitoring as an opportunity to contribute to learning at the local level. They argue that many areas that matter may be hard to measure, such as 'empowerment'. PM&E methods have been particularly associated with generating qualitative data. As Estrella (2000: 10) summarises, 'What most distinguishes PM&E from other more conventional approaches is its emphasis on the inclusion of a wider sphere of stakeholders in the M&E process. PM&E practitioners believe that the stakeholders who are involved in development planning and implementation should also be involved in monitoring changes and determining the indicators for success'. PM&E aims to align monitoring processes with the core development principle of supporting local analysis and action. In its ideal form, it places the most marginalised groups at the centre of systems, focusing on their views, which are liable to be sidelined in top-down approaches. It is argued that this strengthens local ownership of activities and so increases the chance that interventions are relevant, sustainable and effective. Communication may be enhanced between local people and implementing staff, strengthening collaboration and moving beyond 'monitoring as policing' to genuine reflection, learning and improvement. In these conditions, PM&E can be both the means and the end of empowerment.
IDS Bulletin
The literature also identifies some significant limitations of PM&E. As in wider participatory practice, it may be difficult to achieve a high level of 'participation' in practice. Local elites may dominate dialogue and traditionally marginalised people may continue to be excluded. Achieving more 'authentic' participation means engaging with local politics and developing locally relevant methods. These processes tend to be time consuming and expensive (Cooke and Kothari 2001) . The rigour of participatory processes, and the data they generate, is often questioned as being subjective and unreliable. It can be difficult to aggregate qualitative data or draw general conclusions from it. Institutional incentives tend to mitigate against PM&E: while donors and senior managers have sanctions that can force implementing organisations to meet their requirements, intended beneficiaries do not (Brett 2003) . Authentic participation requires other stakeholders to be willing and able to listen, change and share the power to make decisions, which can be contrary to their immediate interests.
A significant proportion of the literature on PM&E tends to assume an idealised commitment to participatory practice and that managers have the time and resources to invest in it. It does not consistently recognise the competing pressures that managers and donors face and their need for replicable systems that generate reliable performance data.
Feedback systems
Feedback systems are emerging as a subset of PM&E as a systematic approach to monitoring development interventions. They generate 'customer-orientated' data about intended beneficiaries' perceptions of how well an intervention is working during its life cycle. Feedback data can monitor either the process of an intervention (such as the quantity and quality of services provided by staff) and/or the results achieved (such as changes in farming practices or income).
The Oxford Dictionaries define feedback as 'information about reactions to a product, a person's performance of a task, etc. which is used as a basis for improvement.' 3 In the agricultural context, the Agricultural Learning and Impacts Network (ALINe) defines feedback systems as the systematic approach to collecting the views of smallholder farmers and other key stakeholders about the quality and impact of work undertaken by an implementing organisation. 4 This usually has a particular focus on generating quantitative data -data that may describe different dimensions of satisfaction based on farmers' own experiences and which can be tracked over time and compared (or benchmarked) across project sites. Such data can capture the perspectives of those who are often marginalised. If collected and analysed in a systematic way, it can provide valuable performance data to managers and funders. Where feedback systems are used to bring different stakeholders together to discuss data and identify actions for improvement, they can become a powerful instrument for learning and change.
Feedback systems in development have grown out of three bodies of work: participatory monitoring and evaluation, social accountability and customer satisfaction. As described above, participatory monitoring and evaluation approaches have been paying careful attention to the perceptions and aspirations of intended beneficiaries for decades. More recently, the emergence of participatory numbers, described by Chambers as 'a quiet revolution', provide the means of generating quantitative data from participatory processes (Chambers 2007 ).
Social accountability is an approach to implementing the 'good governance' agenda, as a means for active citizens to hold governments to account for policy and practice. A variety of different methods have been developed, including feedback-based tools such as citizen report cards and community scorecards. These established methods are promoted by the World Bank, mirroring developments in domestic public management (Thindwa et al. 2005) . They generate quantitative summaries of citizens' perceptions of government service delivery. The data are used as a tool for accountability, to engage with implementing organisations and encourage them to meet their obligations.
Customer satisfaction can be defined as 'a measure of how products and services supplied by a company meet or surpass customers' expectations'.
5 From roots in the early 1960s, it has become one of the best established approaches to assessing and analysing performance in the commercial sector. A whole industry has emerged to measure customer satisfaction and to help companies improve the customer-orientation of their services (Bonbright and Power, this IDS Bulletin). A few initiatives have applied such principles to monitor the performance of development organisations as grant-makers and donors (See Box 4). However, surprisingly, very few development organisations apply these methods to monitor their own field work. While a few innovators exist such as CARE and ACDI/VOCA, 6 this suggests there may be a major gap in the international development sector.
The case for using feedback systems to monitor development assistance is still unproved. They appear to offer significant benefits and some suggestive examples are emerging. But significant questions remain unanswered.
Carefully implemented, it is argued that feedback systems can generate monitoring data for senior decision-makers and also improve practice at the field level: they can link management systems and participatory processes. The monitoring data summarises the views of intended beneficiaries, similar to customer satisfaction data in business. The process of collecting data and discussing it at field level can create opportunities to improve projects, strengthen relationships and help achieve development goals. If performance is monitored according to local people's opinions, then field staff have incentives to listen and respond to their concerns and priorities (Jacobs, this IDS Bulletin) . For instance, in Bangladesh a social movement uses feedback from women's self-help groups to assess staff performance (Jupp and Ibn Ali 2010) .
Box 4 Using feedback to measure donor performance
A number of initiatives use feedback to monitor the performance of donors, networks and international NGOs in development assistance: the Center for Effective Philanthropy pioneered the approach of using quantified grantee feedback to assess the performance of charitable foundations in the USA. Their confidential reports describe each foundation's performance in comparison to sector benchmarks. They have driven significant internal reflection and improvement. See www.effectivephilanthropy.org.
Keystone is applying the same approach to generating feedback from the recipients of grant-makers in East and Southern Africa, from Southern organisations supported by international NGOs, from the members of international networks and from the investees of social investment funds. See www.keystoneaccountability.org.
DARA generates the Humanitarian Response Index which reports and compares the performance of official humanitarian agencies as perceived by their operating partners. See www.daraint.org.
There is a powerful practical case that the people who are best placed to assess how well an intervention is meeting local priorities are the intended beneficiaries themselves: 'ask them' as Chambers put it (Jupp and Ibn Ali 2010) . The gendered effect of development interventions can potentially be monitored by disaggregating feedback from women and men. When feedback data are benchmarked, comparisons can create a powerful incentive for operating units to improve: no one wants to stay bottom of the class. It is also argued that, as in PM&E more generally, feedback systems can align monitoring systems with central development principles of empowering local communities and helping them have more influence over the institutions which affect their lives. There is a powerful ethical case for development agencies to apply these principles internally to how they work themselves (Jacobs, this IDS Bulletin) .
There are also concerns and challenges about implementing feedback systems, similar to those outlined above for PM&E. Feedback systems have to be sensitively adapted to the local context, which requires time and expertise, particularly to capture views from the most poor and marginalised people. Context-specific methods are required for data collection and engagement, often in local languages and locations, which create the conditions for honest reflection (Jacobs and Wilford 2010; Chambers 1997) . These systems are liable to political manipulation, as respondents may give feedback that they believe will be most advantageous to them. As a result, high-quality data collection can be expensive, particularly at the field level. The development sector as a whole is at an early stage of creating practical tools that link highlevel oversight with locally relevant concepts, such as the Coping Strategies Index (Maxwell and Caldwell 2008) .
The benefits of feedback systems can only be realised if implementing staff and organisations have the flexibility to deliberate and respond to the data. Feedback is likely to be one consideration among many that influence senior PM&E meets the needs of field staff to engage sensitively with local people and support their processes of building knowledge, skills and confidence. Feedback systems appear to offer a way of linking the two, by providing summary data for managers and creating incentives for implementing staff to focus on local peoples' priorities. There is suggestive evidence that they can improve accountability in development interventions.
Feedback systems do not attempt to replace PM&E, but build on its rich heritage. They also draw on key principles from customer satisfaction in the private sector. Feedback systems are not incompatible with PM&E or LFA, but are a clearly defined subset of approaches. They address some major concerns expressed in the literature about PM&E and LFA by creating new ways of reconciling the needs of managers while remaining focused on intended beneficiaries. They are also liable to the local complexities and institutional pitfalls that have dogged PM&E.
Development practice is littered with examples of over-engineered and complex monitoring systems that are developed as a result of topdown approaches. 7 They can become too ungainly to be useful. By focusing more narrowly on 'feedback' it may be possible to create smaller, more manageable sets of monitoring data -and importantly, incentives for interventions to be responsive to the priorities of their intended beneficiaries. This may help reduce the temptation to design monitoring systems that attempt to measure too much, too quickly and in the process become burdensome and unmanageable. In this way feedback systems may provide an entry point for the incremental development of more comprehensive and effective monitoring systems. There is still a great deal to learn about how feedback systems work most cost effectively and in which contexts. 
